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PRICE POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL 
EXPORT PERFORMANCE IN JAMAICA 
Jamaica represents one of the most extreme development experiences 
among the lesser developed countries (LDCs) during the past twenty 
years. Following fairly r~spectable growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the 1960's, the country registered growing balance of payments 
crises, increased inflation, and almost uninterrupted negative rates of 
growth from 1973 to 1980. Within this scenario the performance of the 
agricultural sector played an important role. This article is 
concerned with doc\.U'llenting and evaluating that experience with respect 
to the treatment and performance of agricultural export activities.!/ 
In particular, we investigate the influence of the major conmodity 
boards' policies on agricultural export production. It is our contention 
that prices make a difference and failure to recognize this proviso 
has led to counterproductive policies by the commodity boards with 
negative consequences for the country's export performance. We also 
attempt to explain the rationale behind the observed price policies of 
the boards and determine the beneficiaries of these policies.l/ 
In the first section of the paper we discuss both the stated 
and the implicit goals of the commodity boards in Jamaica. Next, 
trends in economic growth, export output and pricing patterns for 
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selected export crops are presented. We then analyze these trends and 
the use of price policy to meet stated and/or implicit goals. In so 
doing we undertake the measurement of nominal protection coefficients 
for export crops to establish the relative degree of implicit taxation 
or subsidization; analyze variations in F.O.B. and farrngate prices; 
estimate the supply response of selected export crops; and, draw out 
the implications of these findings in our conclusions. 
Export Crop Pricing Policy 
Government controlled marketing boards are set up for a variety 
of reasons: price stability, revenue collection (through explicit 
taxes) and the maximization of foreign exchange earnings (Hertford; 
Bovet and Unnevehr; Olayide, et al.; Brown). In Jamaica, export crop 
marketing boards are statutory bodies under the control and supervision 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. The board membership is a mix of 
growers and appointed officials. The main responsibilities of these 
boards are to promote the development of their respective export crops 
and engage in orderly marketing of the crop. 
The boards also are expected to promote price stability and 
maximize foreign exchange earning~ •. However, given the mix of private 
growers and government officials, it may be that board members have 
their own interests at heart. That is, the board undertakes as its 
function the maximization of profits from its selling and buying 
operations. These profits are then used to increase board member 
salaries, to grant concessionary loans for privileged growers (i.e., 
board members), finance board owned plantations at the expense of 
individual farmers, etc. 
i 
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Pricing policy then becomes an important modus operandi in 
achieving various board functions. For example, if the board wishes 
to maximize foreign exchange and promote the industry, then the price 
received by the farm should be the world price received by the board 
minus the costs of processing. But, if the board wishes to maximize 
its profits, then the price set is detennined by the following 
formulation: 
The profit equation for the board is: 
where PW is the world price; PF is the farrngate price; n is board 
profits; C is the cost of processing; and SE is the quantity of the 
export crop supplied. 
(2) 
The first order condition is: 
an 
as 
E 
where n is the price elasticity of supply of the export crops. 
The price to the farmer is then: 
p - c w 
(1 + 1/n) 
Farmers are then subject to some price discrimination if supply 
is not perfectly elastic (n # 00). That is, fanners receive a price 
less than the F.O.B. price minus the cost of processing. Hence, the 
more elastic supply is, the lower will be the output produced and the 
lower the foreign exchange earned. Monopsony power of the board then 
-4-
determines both the equilibrium price and the quantity of the export 
crop. This policy also reduces the benefits to society, as less 
foreign exchange is available for imports. Furthermore, income 
distribution is worsened as only a select few benefit from the 
revenue collected by the board, and not society as a whole as in the 
case of a general government taxing policy. This is because board 
members use the revenue for their own purposes and not general fiscal 
programs. 
Jamaican Economic Growth 
In Table 1 the sharp shift in growth performance from the 1960's 
to the 1970's is underscored. Associated with this overall decline 
in GDP was a steady decline in agricultural growth from the early 
1960's onwards and, more to our interest here, a rapid decline in 
export agriculture from the late sixties onwards.~/ Since this data 
_is based on five year moving averages it hides the fact that the period 
from 1978 through 1980 was also made up of consecutive years of negative 
growth in agricultural exports. 
In Table 2 we present the historical growth rates for output, 
F.O.B. prices and farmgate pricee for the principal export crops in 
Jamaica.~/ Except for coffee (where modest growth occurred), all 
crops recorded significant declines in the 1970's (Table 2, Panel A). 
However, it should be pointed out that these output and farmgate 
price figures are only recording actions by the commodity boards pur-
chasing these crops for export. Therefore the decline in export sales 
recorded for bananas, coconuts and citrus are not reflecting a true 
(" n 
Table 1. Real Rates of Growth of the Economy, the Nonagricultural Sector, 
the Manufacturing Sector, the Mining Sector and the Agricultural 
Sector in Jamaica, 1961-197~/ 
National Non-Agr. Manufacturing Mining Agr. Export Agr. 
PeriodE/ GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1962-1967 5.44 5.62 6.10 5. 77 2.13 1.19 
1967-1972 6.28 6.87 4.67 13.30 1.92 -3.14 
1972-1979 -1.51 -1.67 -2.67 - 1.05 1.12 -4.20 
1961-1979 2.81 3.08 2.28 5.26 1. 70 -2.11 
a/ 
- Average annual compounded real rate of growth. 
(' 
Domestic Livestock 
Food Cro2 GDP GDP 
(7) (8) 
1. 56 6. 71 
6.78 0.39 
3.21 1.96 
3.54 3.03 
I 
\JI 
.Q_/Based on 5 year moving averages, for beginning and end points for the years indicated in the table. 
I 
Source: Pollard, 1982, p. 5., Table 1. 
~ 
-6-
Table 2. Growth Rates of Output, F.O.B. Prices and Fanngate 
Prices for Selected Export Crops in Jamaica, 1962-1978. 
Panel A. Growth Rates of Ouq:~ut!!/ 
Sugar 
Period Cane Banana Coconut Cocoa Coffee 
(1) ~2) (3) (4) (5} 
1962-1970 -0.65 -lo.#1 0.74 - 4.20 0.59 
1970-1978 -2.90 - 7.43 -21.0 - 0.54 2.02 
Panel B. Growth Rates of F. 0. B. a/ Prices-
Sugar 
Period Cane Banana Coconut Cocoa Coffee 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1962-1970 -2.75 o.o~l - 2.80 3.09 
1970-1978 4.13 7. 77 4.67 14.06 8.34 
Panel C. Growth Rates of Farmgate Prices~/ 
Sugar 
Period Cane Banana Coconut Cocoa Coffee 
(1) (2) p) (4) (5) 
1962-1970 -5.09 - o. 10E-1 - 3.02 - 2.51 -0.12 
1970-1978 -1.25 5.06 7.06 1.64 9.80 
!!/The growth rates are expressed as average annual ccmpounded growth 
rates, based on three year moving averages. 
'P_/For bananas, the period is 1965-1970. 
Source: Pollard, 1982; Various tables. 
Citrus 
(6) 
-1.49 
-5.92 
Citrus 
(6) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Citrus 
(6) 
-3.80 
-4.07 
' 
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decline in domestic production, but rather the diversion of local output 
to local processing and domestic product markets rather than exports 
through the boards. For cocoa, coffee and sugar, however, the figures 
in Panel A of Table 2 do represent changes in production as the boards 
are the only marketing channel for both domestic and export sales. 
These developments are generally acknowledged in Jamaica. For 
example, bananas are increasingly used as a form of starch in low 
income diets in the face of food shortages. This was especially true 
for the late 1970s. However, Jamaica's foreign exchange constraint was 
somewhat relaxed in 1981 which led to increased food imports and the 
apparent demise of the local banana market. The collapse of the local 
banana market has led to an increase in bananas delivered to the 
board, but a high rejection rate of this fruit has also occurred since 
much local output is not fit for the English market. 
Another example of this diversion of sales to local markets is 
coconuts. The board price paid to farmers, though recording a 
positive rate of growth in the 1970's (7.06 percent per year), was 
clearly inferior to the informal local market non-board price. 
Otherwise there would not have been such a precipitous decline in board 
purchases (21.0 percent per year) in the 1970's. It has been estimated 
that the Coconut Board only buys ten percent of the total production 
of coconuts today whereas in the late 1960's they purchased close to 
ninety percent. Curiously the board has resorted to importing copra 
(which has varied from 100 to 149 percent of local production in the 
mid to late 1970's) and purchasing locally produced soybean oil (made 
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from soybean imports) to replace declining local coconut deliveries since 
th f . . h i . h h b d 1 1 . 51 ey re use to raise t e r prices to mate t e non- oar oca price.-
True, the board faces price controls on the final products it sells 
(e.g. cooking oil, soaps, detergents) which compromises its ability to 
increase prices to farmers, but only a few consumers are able to buy 
coconut products at the controlled prices. 
As is illustrated in Table 2, Panels B and C, for most of the 
traditional export crops farmgate price increases have been substantially 
less than the F.O.B. prices. This indicates that the commodity boards 
have not been passing on world price increases to their local producers 
in both the 1960's and 1970's. This price discrimination has caused a 
continuing decline in output into the 1970's. Further, for all export 
crops the boards willingly pass on world price decreases, but not 
world price increases. 
This poor agricultural export performance in Jamaica from the 
late 1960's onwards contrasts to the generally positive growth record 
recorded by most.other Latin American countries' export sectors. 
Domestic food crops (and peasant producers) invariably experienced 
declines in output and acreage in most Latin American countries through 
the encroachment of expanding export crops, promoted to maximize 
foreign exchange earnings (de Janvry). Jamaica is an exception to 
this pattern. Domestic foodstuffs expanded in the 1970's while agri-
cultural exports declined. This performance was not due to deteriorating 
world price trends for the export crops. Rather it was in large part 
due to foreign exchange shortages which led to food import restrictions, 
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increased local prices of food and increased supply of domestic food 
(Po11ard). Reinforcing this trend wus thP inefficiency associated with 
the pricing and marketing policies of the commodity boards themselves. 
We now turn to an analysis of these pricing policies. 
Analysis of Price Policy 
1. Price Variation 
One objective frequently mentioned by these boards was their 
presumed role in stabilizing prices for local producers. As shown in 
Table 3, except for sugar cane, farmgate prices fluctuated more than 
F.O.B. prices as measured by the coefficient of variation. Hence, 
the boards have not stabilized prices paid to fanners. When this 
C, result is combined with the fact that for many products such as sugar 
cane and cocoa F.O.B. prices were rising faster than farmgate prices, 
one can conclude that in all likelihood these boards generally did not 
pass on price increases, but did pass on price decreases to the fanners. 
Further, the banana, cocoa and coffee boards have set up price stabili-
zation funds, but have never used the money from these funds to stabilize 
prices. The banana board used these funds to help cover costs and the 
coffee and cocoa boards have just kept the funds in the form of time 
deposits in a local bank, rather than using them to stabilize prices. 
2. Implicit Taxation and Maxmization of 
Foreign Exchange Earnings 
The trends in farmgate (i.e. producer) and F.O.B. prices are 
highlighted more closely through the use of nominal protection coefficients 
(NPC's) in Table 4. The NPC is defined as the ratio of prices received 
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Table 3. Comparison of Price Variation Between Farmgate and F.O.B. 
Prices for Selected Export Crops in Jamaica, 1960-1979~/ 
Sugar 
Cane Banana Coconut Cocoa Coffee 
(Percent) 
F.O.B. Price 31. 95 22.34 20.0 (12.o)E/ 33.9 
Farmgate Price 21.0 24.6 22.9 (23.8) 36.4 
~/Price variation is the coefficient of variation defined as the 
standard deviation of the selected price divided by the mean price. 
E_/Number in parentheses is for the years 1960-1977. 
' 
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Table 4. Average Nominal Protection Coefficients for Selected 
Export Crops and tl.e Effective Exchange Rate .:.n Jamaica 
for Selected Time Periods. 
Average 
Effective 
Sugar Exchange ~7te 
Cane Bananas Cocoa Coffee ($J/$US)-Period 
1960-1964 1.12 0.68'!!_/ n.a. 0.75 1. 76 
1965-1969 1.08 0.80 0.84 0.78 1.56 
1970-1974 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.54 1.20 
1975-1979 0. 77 o.so~/ 0.55 0.68 0.74 
~/The NPC is defined as the ratio of the farmgate price to the 
F.O.B. price received in Jamaica minus marketing and processing 
costs: NPC = PF/Pw-c. 
b/ 
- Only the year 1964. 
£/only the year 1975. 
~/The nominal exchange rate deflated by the implicit GDP deflator, 
. base year 1974. 
Source: Pollard, Table 3.5. 
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by local producers to the F.O.B. prices received by the boards minus any 
PF 
NPC = -p~- (Balassa). An NPC ratio 
w-c 
processing and marketing costs: 
greater than one indicates subsidization while a ratio less than one 
indicates that boards are taxing producers for the crop in question. 
The data indicate that sugar, bananas, cocoa and coffee farmers have 
been heavily taxed. by board action in the 1970's (and the latter three 
in the 1960's as well). It was not possible due to data limitations 
to derive NPCs for coconuts and citrus, but a measure of the tax can 
be derived by comparing local and board prices. For both crops, local 
prices were approximately twice the board price. On average the 
rate of taxation (1-NPC) for all export crops has ranged from 11 to 50 
percent in the 1970's. 
At the same time that individual connnodity boards were taxing 
producers through their pricing policies, an increasingly overvalued 
exchange rate (Column 5 of Table 4) was introducing an additional 
implicit tax on exporters by the late 1970's. When one combines the 
implicit taxation from both sources producers were experiencing a 
heavy burden from the mid-1970's onwards. This combined taxation 
(assuming an average overvaluat~.on of 10 percent) has averaged from 21 
to 60 percent for the ·crops in question in the 1970's. Hence, the 
boards have not followed a policy of maximizing foreign exchange earnings 
(which would imply an NPC equal to one). We now explore the factors 
accounting for this heavy taxation of export crops in Jamaica. 
-13-
3. Price Responsiveness and Monopsony Pricing 
A common justification for this implicit taxation is the frequently 
stated belief by board officials that farmers are unresponsive to prices. 
Hence boards are allegedly in a position to exploit this taxing power 
without any effect on output. To test this hypothesis, supply functions 
for the main export crops were estimated. The form of the supply 
function in arithmetic form is as follows: 
(4) Q = a + a 1P 1 + E t 0 t- t 
where Q is the quantity supplied to the board; P 1 is the real farm t t-
level price (nominal price deflated by GDP deflator, 1974 = 100) 
offered by the board lagged one year (except for sugar where 
price is lagged two time periods) and E is the error term. The use 
of the GDP deflator is to capture price changes of all other sectors 
in the economy. All supply elasticities, which are calculated at the 
point of means, shown in Table 5 are significant at the 5 percent 
level and, moreover, real prices explain over 60 percent of the 
variation in output for cocoa, coffee, sugar and citrus. These findings 
highlight the fact that, contrary to board asst.Unptions, farmers are 
indeed responsive to price changes. 
For example· a 10 percent increase in sugar prices would have 
increased sugar output by 3.5 percent over the period 1961-79. In the 
case of coffee, cocoa and citrus these output responses are even 
higher (5 to 6 percent increases in output for a 10 percent price rise). 
The lack of a significant price response for bananas and an apparently 
illogical response for coconuts are easily explained. Both products 
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Table 5. Estimates of Supply Elasticities for Selected 
Export Crops in Jamaica 
-------- --------------------Sugar 
al Period Cane Bananas- Coconut Coffee Cocoa Citrus 
1961 - 1970 0.43 n.s. n.s. 1.12 0. 54 0.49 
1970 - 1979. n.e. n.s. -1. 95 n. s. 0.56 0. 71 
1961 - 1979 0.35 n.s. -1. 34 0.65 0.57 0.52 
~/For bananas, the period is 1965 - 1979. 
n.e. Not estimated. 
n.s. Not significant. 
Source: Pollard, various tables. 
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have local markets separate from the corrnnodity board market. Despite 
real price increases by these two boards, sales to th,>.s~ particular 
boards have been unresponsive or declining since producers have been 
selling to non-board local markets that offer prices higher than board 
prices. 
The supply elasticities can also to be used to examine if the 
boards are engaging in monopsony pricing. This is done by manipulating 
equation (3). It can be seen that l/l+n is equal to the NPC (PF/PW - C) 
and this result is used to derive the NPC that would have been observed 
if monopsony pricing has been employed by the boards. These results 
are presented in Table 6. The pricing behavior of the coffee board 
during the 1960's comes the closest to following a monopsony pricing 
pattern. For all other crops (for all periods) we reject the hypothesis 
that boards set prices to maximize profits, as the actual NPC is at 
least twice the derived monopsony NPC. 
This rejection of monopsony pricing behavior by the boards implies 
that board price policy does not fulfill stated or implicit objectives. 
What criteria, then, detennines prices set by the Boards? First, it 
may be that the Boards have not been forecasting the world market price 
accurately and the prices paid to farmers reflect these miscalculations. 
This answer implies long term Board incompetence which does not seem 
plausible given the accumulated knowledge of world markets by the 
Boards over time. A more logical explanation could be that the Boards 
attempt to maximize profits, but the "monopsony" price paid to farmers 
would be at a level that farmers would not tolerate. Thus, the price 
-16-
Table 6. Comparison of Actual and Monopsony Rates of Nominal 
Protection 
Average Monopsony 
NPC~/ Cro12 Period Actual NPC 
1960-1969 ·1.10 0.30 
Sugar 
1970-1979 0.83 0.30 
1960-1969 0.78 n.e. 
Banana 
1970-1979 0.78 n.e. 
1960-1969 0. 77 0.53 
Coffee 
1970-1979 0.61 0.00 
1960-1969 0.84 0.35 
Cocoa 
1970-1979 0.62 0.32 
~/The monopsony NPC was calculated using the equation NPC = l/l+n. The 
estimates of n are from the estimates of the supply elasticities from 
Table 5; n. e. is not estimated. 
;) 
• 
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that is paid to farmers, neither maximizes the Boards' profits nor the 
amount of foreign exchange that could be earned. 
Beneficiaries of Price Policy 
The beneficiaries of these price policies vary among the Boards 
(see Pollard for a fuller treatment of this). In the case of sugar, 
the revenue collected goes to the government and is used to subsidize 
the government owned sugar mills and local consumers through low, 
controlled prices. For bananas, coconuts and citrus, the chief 
beneficiaries of price policy appear to be the larger farmers who 
control the industry through their board directorships. The benefits 
that accrue to these farmers appear to be in the form of profits 
from the processing plants (and not their farm operations) in the 
case of coconuts and citrus, and cheap credit and input subsidies 
in the case of bananas. Further, urban consuners who can get coconut 
products at the controlled prices also benefit. In the case of 
coffee, local coffee processors have been satisfied at the expense 
of earning additional foreign exchange, since the price paid by 
processors is less than the export F.O.B. price. This had led to a 
subsidization of local processors by coffee farmers. Cocoa has 
imposed the lowest level of taxation of all the export industries, 
but has still reduced possible foreign exchange earnings. The 
bf'ne>f:lts of th.ls tnxntion hnv<> nccnted to the Hnnrd which l111s llRe>d 
this money to establish its own cocoa plantations competing directly 
with cocoa farmers . 
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Conclusions 
The primary conclusions drawn from this analysis of the Jamaican 
export crop sector are two. First, export crop farmers have been 
implicitly taxed by the pricing system of the commodity boards. 
Second, contrary to the asstnnptions of board officials, export crop 
farmers do respond positively to prices. Calculation of nominal 
protection coefficients reveals that export crop farmers have been 
taxed an average of twenty to thirty percent in the 1970's. With 
the exception of sugar which was subsidized in the 1960's, other 
export crops were taxed at 1970 levels in the 1960's. The estimated 
supply response functions show that farmers do respond positively 
to prices. This is in sharp contrast to the statements of commodity 
board officials stating that farmers do not respond to prices and 
that offering farmers higher prices would be a wasted effort. 
Furthermore, these Boards state that price stability is an 
important objective. However, the coefficient of variation for 
fanngate prices is higher than that for F.O.B. prices with the 
exception of sugar. Another important objective of the Boards is the 
earning of foreign exchange. Hcwever, the implicit taxation of farmers 
by the Boards' pricing policies has seriously reduced the level of 
potential foreign exchange earnings and has contributed to the 
growing balance of payments problem in the mid to late 1970's. 
Although the Boards have not set prices to maximize their own 
revenue, they still have sacrificed foreign exchange earnings for 
Board profits. Thus, the pricing policy of the Boards is inefficient 
• 
' 
• 
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both in terms of the maximization of their own profits and in the 
maximization of foreign exchange earnings. 
Implications 
The implicit taxation of export enterprises and the distribution 
of benefits from price policy has thus imposed high social costs on 
Jamaica in terms of efficiency and equity. All farmers in export 
industries have been "forced" to subsidize select interest groups 
(i.e. large farmers; board members) which has led to a worsening of 
the income distribution within Jamaica. The loss of foreign exchange 
earnings compromises Jamaica's capacity to import and impacts on 
all groups in society. Finally, the Boards have not exercised the 
desired flexibility necessary to take advantage of favorable world 
market conditions. This has been a direct result of the Boards desire 
to satisfy select interest groups at the expense of farmers and 
society as a whole • 
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Footnotes 
!/The exact share of agricultural exports in total merchandise exports 
cannot be easily derived. The "true" total foreign earnings of 
Jamaica cannot be estimated due to the implicit pricing system of 
bauxite and alumina exports that arises from the vertically integrated 
nature of this industry. However, after subtracting out the somewhat 
artificially reported export value of bauxite and alumina, agricul-
tural exports averaged 80 percent of the remaining merchandise 
exports over the 1960s and declined to an average of 66 percent over 
the late 1970s. 
~/Most studies of price policies document the implicit economic costs 
and benefits of such policies, but do not engage in exploration of 
the rationale behind these policies. Lewis in an extensive search 
of the literature on price policy states that economists are very 
good at documenting price distortions, but not the reasons behind 
them. 
'}_/Over the decade of the 1970's agriculture accounted for approximately 
one-third of total employment. Also, the share of export agriculture 
of total agricultural GDP averaged 31 percent over the period 1962-
1972, but declined to an average of 20 percent over the late 1970s • 
. ~/The traditional outlets for the two main export crops, sugar and 
bananas, are protected markets in the United Kingdom. Jamaica has 
a quota of 150,000 tons for bananas in the U.K. and receives a 
tariff preference over Latin American banana exports. For sugar, 
.Jamaica has a quota of 135,000 tons in the EEC and a preference under 
the ACP agreement with the EEC. During the 1960's Jamaica's sugar 
' 
• 
• 
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quota was 235,000 tons with the United Kingdom, and 80,000 tons with 
the Unlted States from 1960 until 1974 when the United States Sugar 
Agreement expired. 
2/In 1981 the board increased its price paid to farms by 158 percent 
and the result was an increase in the non-board price to a level of 
148 percent above the board price. Moreover, the board has been 
forced to buy soybean oil locally produced from soybean imports and 
has not been given foreign exchange to import coconut oil. 
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